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Resumen
Este documento analiza la evidencia sobre el canal del crédito bancario en Chile durante el período
1990-2002 sobre la base de información del sector bancario y del sector corporativo. En primer
lugar, se realiza una estimación econométrica de un panel de bancos con el objeto de identificar los
cambios de la oferta de crédito bancario en respuesta a modificaciones de la política monetaria. En
segundo lugar, tomando en cuenta la evidencia recabada en el paso anterior, se construye una
variable agregada cuyo objeto es capturar los principales mecanismos que caracterizan al canal del
crédito bancario. Dicha variable se utiliza en la estimación de un VAR, que nos permite evaluar si
este canal de transmisión amplifica o no el impacto de un cambio en la tasa de política monetaria
sobre la actividad económica. Nuestra conclusión es que el canal del crédito bancario ha
funcionado como un mecanismo de transmisión de política monetaria en Chile durante el período
bajo análisis, teniendo un impacto independiente y significativo sobre la actividad económica.
Abstract
This paper analyses the evidence about the bank-lending channel in Chile during the period 1990-
2002 using data from both the banking sector and the corporate sector. First, we estimate a panel
data of banks to identify shifts in the loan supply curve in response to changes in monetary policy.
Second, taking into consideration the evidence gathered in the previous step, we construct an
aggregate variable aimed to capture the main forces behind the bank lending channel, and we
estimate a VAR system to test whether or not this channel exacerbates the effect of a monetary
policy shock over macroeconomic activity. We conclude that the bank-lending channel has operated
as a monetary policy transmission mechanism in Chile during the sample period, having an
independent and significant effect in terms of macroeconomic activity.
___________________
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modigliani and Miller (1958) undermined enthusiasm about the role of
credit in the economy by suggesting that the capital structure of the
firm was mostly irrelevant. Moreover, the strong and robust correlation
between money and real variables found in the empirical literature in
the 1960s provided strong support for the view that the main
transmission mechanism for monetary policy was through changes in the
cost of capital and their impact on investment (the interest rate
channel).1 In that view, banks were only important because they created
money. In the 1970s, however, the new field of the economics of
information underscored the relevance of capital market imperfections
and the uniqueness of bank loans as against other forms of debt.2 In
this context, the “credit view” emerged as a new way of understanding
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. This literature
distinguishes among two  subchannels, namely, the broad credit channel
and the bank lending channel, although more recent interpretations of
the role that banks play in the transmission of monetary policy
highlight the interaction between the two channels.3
This paper focuses on the bank lending channel, which emphasizes the
role played by banks in the transmission of monetary policy.4 Thus, if
the Central Bank follows a tight monetary policy, interbank lending is
curtailed and the supply of funds for banks drops. Some individual banks
might succeed in lifting funds elsewhere, allowing them to insulate
their loan portfolios against monetary policy. Other banks, however, are
forced to curtail their supply of credit, especially in the face of a
strong negative monetary shock. Such a decrease in the bank loan supply
is likely to be heterogeneous, as well, in the sense that heavily
indebted households and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which
are presumably bank dependent, are crowded out of the market for bank
loans and become severely financially constrained.5 On the other hand,
                        
1. See, for example, Friedman and Schwarts (1963).
2. The seminal paper is  Akerlof (1970), who draws on the market for used
cars to illustrate the problem caused by asymmetric information between dealers
and buyers. Later references include Jaffee and Russell (1976), Townsend (1979),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Diamond (1984), among many others.
3. See, for example, Huang (2003).
4. The broad credit channel (also known as the balance sheet channel) is
related to the supply of credit by all financial intermediaries, emphasizing the
role of asymmetric information in the existence of an external financing
premium. This premium is defined as the difference in the costs of external and
internal financing. The external financing premium depends negatively on the net
worth of a potential borrower and positively on the stance of monetary policy.
Hence, it is a financial accelerator mechanism that amplifies the effects of
monetary policy on investment and consumption decisions. See the appendix for an
overview of how both the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel are
related to the whole set of monetary transmission mechanisms.
5. Because of their comparative advantages in information collection and
processing, as well as their capacity to establish long-term relationships with
their clients, banks are the only ones able to offer credit to certain types of
borrowers. However, banks that serve clients without any other market
alternative have to deal with an asymmetric information problem, since it is
difficult for the market to value their loan portfolios. Those banks will
therefore experience difficulties in substituting their financial sources. For
Example, Goldberg, Cole, and White (2002), using a survey of small firms
conducted by the Federal Reserve, find that larger banks rely on standard
techniques based on financial statements to make their commercial loan
decisions. Smaller banks tend to deviate from these criteria, supporting their2
less binding adverse selection and moral hazard problems allow large
enterprises to maintain, if not increase, their access to domestic bank
loans and other domestic financial sources.6 As a result, the  bank
lending channel exacerbates the impact of a negative monetary policy
shock in aggregate spending.
In distinguishing between movements of the demand and supply of bank
credit—a key issue for interpreting the evidence on the bank lending
channel—we follow a strategy of identification through heterogeneity, by
comparing economic agents that are more likely to be affected by
financial frictions with economic agents that are less likely to be so
affected. In the words of Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995), “By observing
and measuring the differential behavior of economic agents under
consideration, one can potentially attribute some, if not all, of the
difference in behavior to frictions caused by credit markets.”
Although we are well aware that the asymmetric nature of financial
frictions also implies time varying differences, that is, in and out of
times of tight monetary policy, we concentrate on explaining cross-
sectional differences by following a two-step approach. First, we follow
a panel data approach to test how bank characteristics (size, liquidity,
and capitalization) affect the response of loan supply after a change in
monetary policy. Second, using the evidence gathered in the previous
step regarding the main forces behind the bank lending channel, we
construct an aggregate variable—the low/high quality ratio—aimed at
capturing the availability of bank credit to households and SMEs vis-à-
vis large enterprises. Using the low/high quality ratio, we test—within
a vector autoregression (VAR) system—whether the  bank lending channel
exacerbates the effect of a monetary policy shock over macroeconomic
activity.
Our panel data approach is closely related to Hernando and Martínez-
Pagés (2001) and, to a lesser extent, to Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000)
and  Kishan and  Opiela (2000).7 Our VAR approach is mainly related to
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (1995). Using this two-step approach, we
conclude that the bank lending channel has operated as a transmission
mechanism of monetary policy in Chile within the sample period and that
this mechanism has had a significant impact on macroeconomic activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 1 describes
the data, section 2 describes some methodological issues and presents
the empirical results, and section 3 concludes.
                                                                      
decisions with a much more personalized assessment of the entrepreneurs (of
SMEs). In other words, the role played by asymmetric information is twofold: it
affects the capacity of some banks to lift funds in situations of low market
liquidity, and it generates a set of captive clients among banks.
6. For example, if large firms are at the same time being directly affected
by an external shock that is restricting their access to international financial
markets, they will satisfy their financial needs domestically, thereby further
crowding other agents out of financial markets. In addition to taking bank
loans, large Chilean enterprises have been actively issuing new domestic bonds
in recent periods.
7. See Cavieres (2002) for a study about the bank lending channel in Chile
that follows closely Kishan and Opiela (2000).3
2. THE DATA
The data used in this paper come mainly from financial statements of
banks and publicly listed enterprises.
8 Our  dataset covers the period
from the first quarter of 1990 to the second quarter of 2002. We also
make use of several macroeconomic series, which are mostly taken from
the Central Bank of Chile.
When using bank statements, we consider only banks that are active
participants in the credit market, excluding branches of foreign banks
that are mainly devoted to cash and portfolio management activities.
9
This diminishes the problems associated with heterogeneous demand
shocks, because the share of different types of loans in the banks’
portfolios does not differ significantly (see table 1). Even after this
adjustment, our data-set is quite representative of the credit market,
accounting for more than 90 percent of total loans at any point in time
(see figure 1).
From these bank statements we collect total loans, consumer loans,
and commercial loans. The distinction between consumer loans and
commercial loans points also toward a better identification of movements
in the supply of credit.
10 Indeed, evidence indicates a differential
behavior of various types of loans during the business cycle (see figure
2), which suggests that different types of loans may be affected
distinctly by demand shocks.
                        
8.  The bank statements are published in the statistical bulletin of the
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF); the statements of
publicly listed enterprises are taken from a dataset assembled by the Santiago
Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago) containing all the information
provided by the Ficha Estadística Codificada  Uniforme (FECUS), a standardized
statement that every public firm in Chile is required to file quarterly.
9. When estimating the panel data, the original dataset is adjusted slightly
to take into account mergers that occurred during the sample period. We follow
the intermediate strategy proposed by Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001),
generating a new bank when a merger of banks of similar sizes takes place. If
the merger is between banks of significantly different sizes, the data of the
merged bank is considered as data of the largest merging institution and no new
bank appears.
10. As suggested by Hernando and Martinez-Pagés (2001).
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Table 1. Characteristics of the Banking System
a
  Size (percentile) Capitalization (percentile)
Characteristic <25 25-50 50-75 >75 <25 25-50 50-75 >75
Market share (percent)
Total assets 3.9 10.0 23.1 63.0 29.5 40.0 22.8 7.7
Loans 1.1 4.5 20.5 73.9 36.6 46.2 16.5 0.8
Deposits 1.4 5.2 20.6 72.8 35.5 46.0 17.2 1.3
 
Size indicator
Average number of bank-
branches 2.7 12.5 31.3 113.6 78.7 87.3 29.3 1.2
Average total assets
b 12134.2 32117.3 71943.6  205512.1  122427.5      180963.9 97109.9 34402.5
 
Asset composition (percent) 12.9 20.3 40.2 53.1 55.4 51.6 32.2 4.7
Loans 11.6 18.9 38.9 50.7 53.5 49.3 30.0 3.1
Loans to firms 44.3 44.7 57.4 57.0 59.4 58.9 53.4 48.3
Consumer loans 13.6 27.0 10.3 6.1 11.7 7.8 8.7 5.5
Mortgage loans 0.5 2.6 12.3 16.4 11.6 17.6 20.3 0.1
Other loans 41.7 25.7 19.9 20.5 17.3 15.8 17.6 46.1
Securities 6.8 7.8 9.6 14.7 8.8 12.8 10.6 4.6
Other assets 81.6 73.3 51.5 34.6 37.7 38.0 59.3 92.3
 
Liabilities composition (percent)
Deposits 51.2 68.4 63.9 62.5 66.3 64.3 61.1 52.0
Overnight deposits 7.5 4.8 8.6 14.1 11.4 12.7 13.4 7.2
Time deposits 43.8 63.6 55.3 48.4 54.9 51.6 47.7 44.8
Morgage bonds 0.4 2.0 14.7 16.9 17.1 18.4 18.1 0.1
Foreign loans 8.0 9.5 6.7 7.7 4.6 4.2 5.7 2.8
Subordinate bonds 0.0 0.2 1.8 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.2 0.0
Stock of provisions 1.4 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.0
  Capital and    reserves 38.9 17.3 10.4 8.6 7.6 8.9 12.0 44.0
Source: SBIF and authors calculations.
a. This analysis if performed for the whole sample period (1990–2002). Percentiles are calculated for each period.
b. Millions of pesos.5
We also collect our proxies for bank characteristics—size, liquidity,
and capitalization—which are based on how the existing empirical
literature about the bank lending channel captures the potential
problems associated with asymmetric information.
11 Size is defined as
the bank’s share of the total assets of the banking system; liquidity is
defined as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets; and
capitalization is defined as the seasonally adjusted ratio of capital
and reserves to total assets. Table 2 presents the main descriptive
statistics on this set of bank characteristics.
From the statements of publicly listed enterprises, we take the total
large corporate sector bank debt. Using this variable as the denominator
and the consumer loans of the banking system as the numerator, we
construct a variable that we call the low/high quality ratio, to capture
the availability of bank credit to households and SMEs vis-à-vis large
enterprises. Two features of this ratio deserve further explanation: the
extent to which consumer loans capture not only household credit but
also loans directed to SMEs; and the relation of this ratio to a flight
to quality. With regard to the first feature, we could have measured
credit to SMEs more directly using data that is available by size of
loans, but this series is only available since 1996, and with less than
a quarterly frequency. However, when we graph the small business loans
and consumer loans together (see figure 3), the two series follow a
relatively similar path (the correlation is over 90 percent). Credit to
SMEs is, in fact, known to usually take the form of a consumer credit in
the Chilean banking industry, whereas credit to large enterprises
follows a very different path.
                        
11. See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and Kishan and Opiela
(2000).
Figure 2. Annual Growth of Total Loans
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Bank Characteristics
Percent
Characteristic Mean Standard Error Minimum Maximum percentile25percentile50percentile75
Size 4.21 4.01 0.03 19.04 0.87 3.24 5.92
Liquidity 20.69 9.01 4.48 53.92 13.41 19.58 27.26
Capitalization 8.76 9.43 1.09 63.44 4.64 5.68 7.95
Source: Authors calculations.
With regard to the second feature, our low/high quality ratio is
(inversely) related to the indicator of a flight to quality constructed
by Caballero (2002) using precisely the share of large loans from the
available data by size of loans. Although our story is different from
Caballero’s, in the sense that we are trying to pin down the effect of a
monetary policy shock instead of an external shock, the operative
financial mechanism is basically the same: indebted consumers and
especially SMEs are crowded out of the banking system by large firms,
thus becoming severely financially constrained. Figure 4 shows a severe
flight-to-quality effect in 1998–99, a period of extremely tight
monetary policy.
To identify the effect of a monetary policy shock on the supply of
bank loans, we need an indicator that is closely tied to monetary
policy. The international empirical literature offers several
alternatives, but the set of choices in the case of Chile is limited by
data availability. Within this limited choice set, we choose the term
spread, defined as the difference between the monetary policy rate and
the PRC8.12 As explained in Gertler (2000), a positive movement in the
term spread (so defined) simply reflects that the monetary tightening is
                        
12. The PRC8 are long-term indexed bonds issued by the Central Bank of
Chile. See  Estrella and  Mishkin (1998) for a positive assessment of the
predictive power of the term spread; see Gertler (2000) for an explanation of
the close relationship between the term spread and monetary policy, particularly
in periods of significant monetary tightening.














inducing a fall in long-term rates, since there are expectations of a
drop in the short-term interest rate in the near future (see figure 5).
Figure 5. Term Spread
Basis points
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Figure 4. Annual Growth in Low/High Quality Ratio and Term Spread
Percent, moving average
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Finally, we use several macroeconomic series in the panel and the VAR
system. Specifically, in the panel of banks we use the annual growth of
real GDP to capture changes in income, and the annual depreciation of
the real exchange rate to capture movements in relative prices. Both
variables are intended to control for demand effects. In the VAR system,
we use three additional endogenous variables (besides the low/high
quality ratio and the term spread): namely, a proxy for macroeconomic
activity (in logs and seasonally adjusted), the consumer price index (in
logs and seasonally adjusted), and real exchange rate (in logs). We use
six different proxies for macroeconomic activity: real GDP, industrial
production, business investment, durable goods consumption, unemployment
rate, and residential investment. In addition to these endogenous
variables, every VAR model includes the following set of exogenous
variables: terms of trade, inflation target, external output, and a time
trend.13
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our main goal in this section is to analyze whether the bank lending
channel played any role as a transmission mechanism for monetary policy
in the Chilean economy during the period 1990 to 2002 and, if so,
whether this transmission mechanism plays any significant macroeconomic
role. We follow a two-step approach. First, we use a panel data of banks
to identify shifts in the loan supply curve in response to changes in
monetary policy by exploiting the heterogeneity among banks. Such an
exercise lets us gather evidence about where the  bank lending channel
has operated most strongly. Second, we use that knowledge to construct a
variable that is likely to be a good proxy of how the bank lending
channel exacerbates the monetary policy shock, thus having an
independent and significant impact on aggregate spending. This variable
is the low/high quality ratio, which captures the availability of bank
credit to households and SMEs vis-à-vis large enterprises. Here again,
we appeal to heterogeneity for identification purposes, this time among
borrowers. Finally, we embed the low/high quality ratio within a VAR
system to test whether the bank lending channel exacerbates the effect
of a monetary policy shock over macroeconomic activity.
3.1 First Step: A Panel Data of Banks
As discussed in the introduction, a tight monetary policy reduces the
amount of funds available for the banking system, and some banks are
unable to offset the reduction in interbank funds owing to information
problems. How do bank characteristics affect the response of loan supply
following a monetary policy shock? To answer this question, we follow a
panel data approach in which bank characteristics (size, liquidity, and
capitalization) interact with the term spread (our indicator of monetary
policy) to disentangle the differential behavior of banks with regard to
total loans, consumer loans, and commercial loans.
In this panel model, the dynamic structure is adequately handled by
introducing one lag for the endogenous variable and four lags for the
                        
13. This is justified on the grounds that Chile is a small open economy with
an inflation target regime operating since the early 1990s. In particular, by
including the terms of trade, we are controlling for external shocks. Hence, if
we find that the low/high quality ratio influences economic activity following a
monetary policy shock, we can interpret the flight-to-quality effect as being
domestically driven.9
term spread, the variables aimed at controlling for demand effects, and
the variables related to bank characteristics. Although including a lag
of the dependent variable is trivial in the time-series context, the
fixed-effects estimator is severely biased in a dynamic context. Instead
of following the traditional approach to dealing with such a problem—
namely, the Arellano and Bond generalized method of moments (GMM)
procedure—we use the bias-corrected estimator proposed by Hahn and
Kuersteiner (2002).
14
The empirical specification within this panel data approach is the
following:
        
yit = ryit-1 + ¢  x  it- jb + ¢  z it-1g
j=0
4
￿ + x 3it - j ¢  z it -1f
j=1
4




where yit represents the annual growth of total loans, commercial loans,
and consumer loans, respectively;  xit is a vector of macroeconomic
variables aimed at controlling demand-side shocks (annual growth of GDP
and annual depreciation of the real exchange rate) in addition to the
monetary policy indicator (term spread); zit denotes a vector of bank-
specific variables (liquidity, size and capitalization); D is a set of
seasonal dummies; uit is i.i.d; i = 1, ... , N represents the number of
banks included in the dataset; and t = 1, ... , T is the time index from
1990:1 to 2002:2. Note that the bank-specific explanatory variables zit
are included with one lag to account for potential endogeneity.
We disentangle loan-supply from loan-demand effects by looking at
cross-sectional differences in the response of bank loans to a monetary
policy shock. Were these differences to be related to indicators of the
degree of informational asymmetries (size, liquidity, or
capitalization), it would support the existence of the  bank lending
channel. More specifically, if the bank lending channel holds, we should
expect a positive and significant cross-coefficient between the term
spread and bank characteristics.
                        
14. The Arellano and Bond GMM procedure is subject to substantial finite
sample bias, as shown by Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Hahn,  Hausman,
and Kuersteiner (2002). For a more technical discussion of the methodological
issues, see Brock and Franken (2003).10
Table 3. Long-Run Coefficients and Standard Errors
Dependent variable Coefficient Standard Error
1. Growth of total loans
Real GDP growth 0.57 0.19
Real exchange rate devaluation –0.93 0.11
Term spread –4.31 0.46




2. Growth of consumer loans
Real GDP growth 1.09 0.19
Real exchange rate devaluation –0.20* 0.10
Term spread –2.65 0.57




3. Growth of commercial loans
Real GDP growth –0.02 0.37
Real exchange rate devaluation –1.71 0.21
Term spread –6.85 0.99




*Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 3 shows the long-run coefficients for each of the explanatory
variables. First, note that the long-run coefficient for the annual
growth of real GDP, when statistically significant, is positive. Second,
the long-run coefficient for annual real depreciation is always
significant and negative. Third, the long-run coefficient of the term
spread, which is positively related with a tighter monetary policy, is
always significant and negative. Finally, regarding the interaction of
bank characteristics with monetary policy, the results show that
liquidity is always significant and positive, size is positive and
significant only for total loans, and capitalization is positive and
significant only for consumer loans.
Table 4 shows the overall effects of a tight monetary policy in terms
of the annual growth rate of total loans, consumer loans, and commercial
loans.15 As can be seen from the table, tightening monetary policy
results in a larger drop in the growth rate of total loans for small
                        
15. The overall effects include the direct effect of monetary policy plus
the interactive effects of bank characteristics with monetary policy. If the
parameter is  nonsignificant, it is computed as being equal to zero. Bank
characteristics are evaluated at three representative levels for each category.11
banks than for large banks.16 In addition, the drop in the growth rate
of all types of loans is larger for less liquid banks than for more
liquid banks.17 In the case of consumer loans, the bank lending channel
operates through less capitalized banks.18
Table 4. Overall Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on the Growth Rate of Loans





Type of loan 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
Total –4.2 –3.9 –3.5 –4.3 –4.3 –4.3 –3.3 –2.8 –2.2
Consumer –2.6 –2.6 –2.6 –2.4 –2.3 –2.2 –1.8 –1.4 –0.9
Commercial –6.9 –6.9 –6.9 –6.9 –6.9 –6.9 –5.0 –4.2 –3.1
Our preliminary results thus support the idea that the bank lending
channel has operated in Chile. Furthermore, consumer loans seems to
capture better the role played by informational asymmetries in the
response of bank loans to monetary policy shocks. Indeed, both liquidity
and capitalization have played a restrictive role for consumer loans,
while commercial loans have only been affected by liquidity. We argued
above that consumer loans are a reasonably good proxy for bank credit
directed to both households and SMEs. Hence, our results in this first
step suggest that the decrease in banks’ loan supply may have actually
been heterogeneous, affecting more SMEs and, to a lesser extent, highly
indebted households than large enterprises. The next step concentrates
on providing more solid evidence along this line.
3.2 Second Step: A VAR System Including an Aggregate Proxy for
the Bank Lending Channel
The fact that the banks’  loan supply affects borrowers
heterogeneously can be exploited to identify how the bank lending
channel exacerbates a monetary policy shock. We therefore construct the
low/high quality ratio to capture the availability of bank credit to
households and SMEs vis-à-vis large enterprises.19 More specifically, we
ask the following question regarding the impact of monetary policy on
the real sector of the economy: does the bank lending channel play any
significant macroeconomic role as a monetary transmission mechanism? To
answer this question, we analyze whether the low/high quality ratio has
marginal predictive power over a set of macroeconomic variables.
We expect a negative monetary policy shock to reduce the low/high
quality ratio (flight to quality), which would strongly affect bank-
dependent households and  SMEs by eliminating their only source of
                        
16. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an
annual reduction of 4.2 percent in total loans when the bank is small, but only
3.5 percent when the bank is large.
17. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an
annual reduction of 3.3 percent in total loans, 1.8 percent in consumer loans,
and 5.0 percent in commercial loans for a less liquid bank. On the other hand, a
one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an annual
reduction of only 2.2 percent in total loans, 0.9 percent in consumer loans, and
3,1 percent in commercial loans for a highly liquid bank.
18. A one percentage point increase in the term spread accounts for an
annual reduction of 2.4 percent in consumer loans when the bank is less
capitalized, but only 2.2 percent when the bank is more capitalized.
19. See section 1 for a more detailed explanation of this particular
variable.12
external funding.20 For example, casual evidence for the Chilean economy
shows that SMEs have quite limited access, if any, to bond issuing or
capital raising in the stock market.21 In other words, the decline in
the low/high quality ratio represents a decrease in portion of the
banks’ loan supply directed to those economic agents (households and
SMEs) who bear the largest share of the costs associated with
information problems. This may, in turn, have a significant effect on
economic activity.22
The empirical approach used in this section consists in estimating a
set of VAR models in levels, each of which includes the low/high quality
ratio that accounts for the existence of the bank lending channel. Four
endogenous variables are also included, namely, the term spread as the
indicator of the monetary policy stance, a proxy for macroeconomic
activity (with six different alternatives), the real exchange rate, and
the price level. Finally, every model includes a set of exogenous
variables: terms of trade, inflation target, external output, and a time
trend.23
To assess the macroeconomic importance of the bank lending channel,
we test for the marginal predictive power of the credit variable
(low/high quality ratio) by carrying out Granger causality tests and
reporting the corresponding p values. A rejection of the null hypothesis
that the credit variable is irrelevant for predicting macroeconomic
activity is one piece of evidence in favor of the bank lending channel.
This evidence has to be complemented with two simultaneous conditions,
however: rejection of the null hypothesis that the term spread is
irrelevant for predicting the credit variable and failure to reject the
null hypothesis that the proxy for macroeconomic activity is useless in
predicting the credit variable. In other words, the bank lending channel
requires that lagged values of the term spread be significant in
predicting the credit variable, which in turn must be significant in
predicting either macroeconomic activity or other macroeconomic
variables.
Table 5 shows the Granger causality test for each VAR model. The
results support the hypothesis that the low/high quality ratio predicts
macroeconomic variables in all cases. These results also indicate that
the lags of the term spread are significant for predicting macroeconomic
variables in just three out of six cases.24 On the other hand,
macroeconomic variables are not helpful for predicting the low/high
quality ratio in each case, whereas the term spread is helpful for
predicting the low/high quality ratio in all cases. The empirical
                        
20. See footnote 5.
21. This is consistent with the international empirical evidence, which
shows that finding alternative sources of credit is quite difficult for SMEs.
22. The drop in the supply of bank credit pushes  SMEs to curtail their
productive activities, which are usually labor intensive. This has a strong
impact in terms of job destruction, since the affected workers are generally
unskilled and thus difficult to absorb into other sectors in the economy. Given
that increasing unemployment rates are strongly correlated with consumer
confidence (in the United States and elsewhere), aggregate demand falls. Hancock
and Wilcox (1998) find that small banks engage in “high power” credit
activities, in that a one-dollar drop in their credit supply has a large impact
on economic activity, measured in terms of unemployment, real wages, GDP, and
number of bankruptcies.
23. We use a two-step procedure to define the optimal lag structure
(Johansen, 1995): the first step uses the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion; the second
step adds additional lags for eliminating any evidence of serial correlation
detected by the multivariate LM test statistics for residual serial correlation.
24. At the 5 percent level of significance.13
evidence thus strongly supports a causality running from monetary policy
to credit and from credit to macroeconomic activity.
Table 5. VAR Pairwise Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
a
P values from exclusion test















e Monetary policy shock 95.6 GDP 73.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.2
Industrial production
e Monetary policy shock 4.5 Industrial production 90.7
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.5 Monetary policy shock 0.6
Business investment
e Monetary policy shock 68.7 Business investment 66.5
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.2
Durable consumption
f Monetary policy shock 0.2 Durable consumption 52.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 1.9 Monetary policy shock 3.3
Unemployment rate
e Monetary policy shock 44.7 Unemployment 95.6
  Low/high quality mix ratio 0.0 Monetary policy shock 0.8
Residential investment
f
Monetary policy shock 3.1 Residential investment 55.4
  Low/high quality mix ratio 1.9 Monetary policy shock 2.5
a. This table shows the results obtained from six VAR models. Each one uses a different option for measuring
macroeconomic activity: real GDP, industrial production, business investment, durable consumption, the unemployment
rate, and residential investment. Each proxy is added one at time to the base VAR. The base model comprises five
variables: real GDP, the consumer price index, the term spread, the low/high quality mix ratio, and the real exchange rate.
The exogenous variables are the terms of trade, the inflation target , external output, and a time trend.
b. The numbers in the table are the p values for the null hypothesis that some variables contain no information for the
dependent variable. For each model, we choose the equations that represent both the proxy for macroeconomic activity
and the credit variable (low/high quality mix ratio). We then test, respectively, whether the term spread and the credit
variables do not Granger cause  macroeconomic activity and whether macroeconomic activity and monetary policy do not
Granger cause the credit variable. In other words, if the p value is lower than 5 percent, we can reject the null hypothesis.
c. Ratio of credit bank loans for consumer and small firms to short-term bank debt of all firms, from FECUS dataset.
d. The exogenous variables are a time trend, the inflation target, the terms of trade, and external output.
e. Endogenous variables have two lags, exogenous variables have two lags.
f. Endogenous variables have three lags; exogenous variables have two lags
To study the dynamics of the  bank lending channel, we estimate a
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) and report impulse responses to
a monetary policy shock. The set of identifying assumptions is borrowed
from a vast list of authors who use this type of identification scheme
in VAR models.25 Variables are thus divided into three recursive sets:
nonpolicy variables that are not contemporaneously affected by the
policy variables; policy variables; and nonpolicy variables that are
contemporaneously affected by the policy variables.26 In other words,
the Central Bank’s feedback rule is identified by dividing the set of
nonpolicy variables into variables that cause a policy reaction and
variables that are affected by the policy reaction. For the policy
variables, we assume the following sequence of events: the Central Bank
first sets an inflation target, which is an exogenous variable, and it
                        
25. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1997, 1999);
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995);  Strogin (1995); Bernanke and Blinder (1992);
Bernanke and Mihov (1998); and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). For the case of
Chile, see Bravo and García (2002).
26. In our particular case, we use an exactly identified VAR because
additional identifying restrictions in the parameters do not change the results
obtained in the impulse response functions.14
then sets the monetary policy stance.27 For the nonpolicy variables, we
assume a recursive causal relationship ordered as follows: price level,
output, and the credit variable.28 Our positioning of the variable used
as a proxy for the bank lending channel (low/high quality ratio) in last
place is based on the assumption that the Central Bank is able to affect
it contemporaneously through the monetary policy stance, since capital
markets tends to respond faster than goods and labor markets.29
Figure 6 displays the estimated impulse responses represented by
black lines. The low/high quality ratio decreases following the monetary
policy shock, a result that is consistent with a flight-to-quality
effect as described above. GDP declines about two quarters after a
tightening in monetary policy. The maximum decline occurs about a year
after the shock, and the effect gradually dies out thereafter. We
observe a similar pattern when GDP is substituted with industrial
production or unemployment rate, although the effect seems to be more
persistent in the latter case.
When both investment and durable consumption replace GDP, these two
components of aggregate output decline during the first year and a half.
Such a result differs from the international empirical evidence. For
example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) find evidence that in the United
States the decline of durable consumption and residential investment
precede business fixed investment. Their interpretation is against the
conventional monetary policy transmission mechanism that operates
through an earlier decline in investment. In the Chilean case, however,
the impulse responses indicate that durable consumption and both types
of investment decrease at approximately the same time. We interpret this
as evidence that both transmission mechanisms are relevant for Chile.
                        
27. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the monetary policy
rate is used as a fine-tuning policy, given a known inflation target.
28. The assumption behind this order is that the price level is stickier
than output, a fact that is consistent with the high level of backward
indexation in the Chilean economy (Jadresic, 1996).
29. To illustrate the identifying assumptions described above, assume that
the Central Bank contemporaneously knows the evolution of the inflation rate but
is not able to affect it. If the economy faces an inflationary shock (an oil
shock, for instance), the Central Bank could respond with a change in the
monetary policy rate. This, in turn, will have an immediate impact on other
variables, such as the low/high quality ratio and the exchange rate. Only then
may monetary policy affect variables such as GDP, investment, consumption, and
inflation.15
Figure 6. Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E on Monetary Policy Shock
a
Low/high quality mix ratio   GDP Industrial Production
Business Investment Durable Consumption Unemployment Rate
Residential Investment
a. For VAR specification, see table 5. Black lines for the BLC (low/high quality ratio) are 
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The empirical strategy described above allows us to compare the impulse
responses to a monetary policy shock in two different systems, in which
the variable used as a proxy for the bank lending channel (low/high
quality ratio) is first defined as endogenous (black lines) and then as
exogenous (gray lines). Shutting down the bank lending channel effect on
other macroeconomic variables following a monetary policy shock
establishes a measure of the macroeconomic relevance of the bank lending
channel: namely, the difference between the two impulse responses30. To
determine whether this difference is statistically significant, we
display the dashed lines that represent a 95 percent confidence interval
for each impulse response function when the  bank lending channel is
endogenous. If the impulse response functions calculated under the
assumption that the credit variable is exogenous fall outside this
confidence interval, we interpret this as evidence in favor of the
macroeconomic relevance of the bank lending channel.
What do we find? The bank lending channel is unambiguously relevant
in terms of GDP, business investment, and the unemployment rate, since
the responses of these variables are definitely much weaker if the bank
lending channel is exogenously included in the system. The other results
also support the macroeconomic relevance of the bank lending channel to
a degree, since durable consumption, residential investment, and
industrial production are on the brink of being statistically different
from the case of an endogenous bank lending channel.31
 4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We conclude that the  bank lending channel operated as a monetary
policy transmission mechanism in Chile during the period 1990–2002, with
an independent and significant effect in terms of macroeconomic
activity. The way that the bank lending channel seems to have operated
in Chile is consistent with the international empirical evidence: first,
some banks—less liquid banks and, to a lesser extent, small and less
capitalized banks—are forced to curtail their supply of credit following
a monetary policy shock; second, the access of households and  SMEs to
external financing is severely restricted following the drop in the
supply of bank credit; third, the uneven distribution of the drop in the
supply of bank credit, which can be associated to a flight-to-quality
effect, has a significant influence in terms of macroeconomic activity.
By pushing toward a better understanding of the way in which the bank
lending channel operates as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy
in Chile, our paper contributes to an improvement of the monetary policy
decision framework.
                        
30. From the Granger causality tests, we already know that the empirical
evidence strongly supports a causality running from monetary policy to credit
and from credit to macroeconomic activity. What we are doing here, therefore, is
determining whether the flight-to-quality effect occurs as a result of a
monetary policy shock or is driven by other factors.
31. We are using a relatively small data set given the relatively large set
of variables included in the VAR system, meaning that we are dealing with large
sampling uncertainty. The 95 percent confident interval is thus a rather strict
test. For instance, researchers tend to use +/–1 standard deviation when dealing
with large sampling uncertainty, meaning that a 67 percent confidence interval
for the true impulse response function is considered good enough for the purpose
at hand (see, for example, Stock and Watson, 2001). If we use the latter
benchmark, the macroeconomic relevance of the bank lending channel is
unambiguously supported for all variables used as a proxy for macroeconomic
activity.17
Our focus in this paper is on explaining cross-sectional differences
among economic agents (banks, firms, and, to a lesser extent,
households). The evidence gathered in this paper therefore points toward
a bank lending channel operating across the sample period, abstracting
from the asymmetries related to times in and out of tight monetary
policy and from the evolution of certain features in the economy that
may affect the strength of the bank lending channel. For example,
information problems are likely to be less binding in periods of
relatively loose monetary policy, rendering the bank lending channel
much less relevant as a transmission mechanism in comparison with
periods of a tighter monetary stance. In particular, the large monetary
policy shock in 1998–99 probably represents the bank lending channel
operating at its maximum strength, although the counterfactual exercise
of what would have happened had the exchange rate been allowed to
depreciate sharply points to the possibility of a financial accelerator
mechanism as well, through larger balance sheet effects. Another example
is the role played by the increase in the capital-base of banks during
the 1990s, as well as the more widespread use of credit scoring. Both
trends have probably strengthened the capacity of banks to deal with
informational asymmetries.
This study underscores at least four avenues for future research that
may deepen our knowledge of the functioning of the credit channel, in
general, and the bank lending channel, in particular, as transmission
mechanisms for the monetary policy in the Chilean economy: ( i)
improvements in measuring the monetary policy shock; (ii) improvements
in measuring the costs for bank-dependent borrowers associated with a
drop in banks’ credit supply; (iii) improvements in incorporating the
effects of policy changes and financial sector developments; and (iv)
improvements in assembling more comprehensive datasets at the
microeconomic level.18
APPENDIX: SUBCHANNELS OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION
The different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy can be
illustrated by means of the diagram in figure A1 (Kuttner and  Mosser,
2002). The transmission mechanism process begins with the Central Bank’s
definition of a monetary policy rate. The interbank rate then converges
to this objective through the regulation of the liquidity of the
financial system. Once the liquidity of the financial system is
adjusted, different mechanisms start operating in the transmission
channel. Four of these are activated by market interest rates moving in
tandem with the  interbank interest rate.  These are the interest rate
channel, in which an increase in the cost of capital reduces the
domestic aggregate demand through a fall in investment and in the
consumption of durable goods; the exchange rate channel (in open
economies), which operates through the effect of the uncovered interest
rate parity on net imports; the asset price channel (stocks, bonds, and
real states), which generates a wealth effect that has an impact on
consumers’ decisions; and the broad credit channel (broad credit
channel), which is also related to the market value of assets and which
is described in the introduction. The transmission mechanism of monetary
policy does not end there, however. It is possible to distinguish two
additional channels, namely, the monetarist channel related to changes
in relative prices of assets and the bank lending channel (bank lending
channel), the main issue of our paper.
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